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Special Contribution

A Look Back at
Reed v. Town of Gilbert
by Newton M. Galloway*
and Steven L. Jones'
Three years have passed since the Supreme Court of the United States
invalidated the Sign Code enacted by the Town of Gilbert, Arizona (the
Town), and virtually every other sign ordinance enacted by local
governments across the country.' Reed v. Town of Gilbert2 arose when
the Town determined that temporary signs advertising the place and
time of the transient Sunday services conducted by the Good News
Community Church (the Church), led by Pastor Clyde Reed, violated its
Sign Code. The Church was cited for Sign Code violations, and the
Church challenged the Sign Code on constitutional grounds in the United
States District Court for the District of Arizona. The district court upheld
the constitutionality of the Town's Sign Code on summary judgment, and
3
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 4 Overruling the lower courts, the

*Partner in the firm of Galloway & Lyndall, LLP. Mercer University (B.A., 1978);
Mercer University School of Law (J.D., 1981); Member, Mercer Law Review (1979-1981).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
"Associate in the firm of Galloway & Lyndall, LLP. University of Georgia (B.B.A.,
2012); Mercer University School of Law (J.D., 2016). Member, Mercer Law Review (20142016). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2224 (2015). Reed is of note in the State
of Georgia because the author of the majority opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas, is a
Georgia native and several attorneys that represented the Town are based in the state.

2. 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
3. Id. at 2225-26.
4. Id. at 2226.
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Supreme Court subjected the Town's Sign Code to strict scrutiny analysis
and held that it violated the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution5 as an unconstitutional regulation of speech content.6
Instantly, every jurisdiction that had passed a sign ordinance learned
that its regulations must pass constitutional muster under strict scrutiny
analysis and that any sign regulation could be interpreted as contentbased on its face. 7
After Reed, many sign ordinances are still in effect yet contain
unchallenged, potentially unconstitutional content-based regulations.
Even though Reed purports to establish a simple rule that content-based
sign regulations violate the First Amendment, the line between an
"entirely reasonable" 8 sign regulation and one that is constitutionally
infirm after being subjected to strict scrutiny constitutional analysis has
yet to be drawn. As Justice Kagan poignantly noted in her concurrence:
The consequence of [the majority opinion]-unless courts water down
strict scrutiny [for First Amendment sign challenges] to something
unrecognizable-is that our communities will find themselves in an
unenviable bind: They will have to either repeal the exemptions that
allow for helpful signs on streets and sidewalks, or else lift their sign
restrictions altogether and resign themselves to the resulting clutter.9
On the other hand, "entirely reasonable" sign ordinances may need to
give way. As Justice Thomas espoused, "a clear and firm rule governing
content neutrality is an essential means of protecting the freedom of
speech, even if laws that might seem'entirely reasonable' will sometimes
be 'struck down because of their content-based nature."'10 Thus, the
constitutionality of sign regulations under the jurisprudence of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit will not be
settled until the contours of Reed's sweeping rule are refined in cases
with the right factual circumstances and litigants.

5. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228-29, 2233.
7. Id. at 2228-29.
8. See id. at 2239 (Kagan, J., concurring) ("Because I see no reason why such an easy
case calls for us to cast a constitutional pall on reasonableregulations quite unlike the law
before us, I concur only in the judgment." (emphasis added)).
9. Id. at 2237.
10. Id. at 2231 (quoting City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 60 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
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I. REED'S ELEVENTH CIRCUIT AND GEORGIA PREDECESSORS
Constitutional challenges to sign ordinances based on alleged
unconstitutional content regulation in Georgia and the Eleventh Circuit
precede Reed by more than twenty years. Union City Board of Zoning

Appeals v. Justice Outdoor Displays, Inc.," the premier Georgia case
involving a constitutional challenge to a sign ordinance based on content
regulation, involved a sign ordinance that distinguished between
"on-premise" and "off-premise" signs.1 2 An "on-premise" sign was
typically a sign which advertises "a product, service, [or] person ...
located or obtainable on . . . the lot where such sign is located."13
defined
as
a
"off-premise"
sign
was
Conversely,
an
sign which advertises "a product, service, [or] person . . located or
obtainable elsewhere other than the lot where such sign is located."1 4 The
restriction limited "on-premise" signs to commercial messages
concerning the goods or services offered at the site of the particular
business. 15 This content-based distinction sparked the constitutional
challenge.16
In its opinion in Union City, the Georgia Supreme Court noted that, in
Messer v. City of Douglasville,17 the Eleventh Circuit upheld the
constitutionality of an ordinance that distinguished between "onpremise" and "off-premise" content, determining that the "on-premise/offpremise distinction is viewpoint neutral and, 'regulates signs not based
on the viewpoint of the speaker, but based on the location of the signs."'"8
However, the Georgia Supreme Court instead followed the Supreme
Court of the United States' holding in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San
Diego,19 affirming the trial court's holding that the "prohibition against
the display of noncommercial messages in places where commercial signs
are permitted violate[s] the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution and the Free Speech Clause of the Georgia Constitution." 20
Subsequently, in Fulton County v. Galberaith,21 the Georgia Supreme
Court similarly held that a provision of the Fulton County sign

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

266 Ga. 393, 467 S.E.2d 875 (1996).
Id. at 394, 467 S.E.2d at 878.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 394-95, 467 S.E.2d at 878.
975 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1992).
Union City, 266 Ga. at 397, 467 S.E.2d at 880 (quoting Messer, 975 F.2d at 1509).
453 U.S. 490 (1981).
Union City, 266 Ga. at 394-97, 467 S.E.2d at 878-79.
282 Ga. 314, 647 S.E.2d 24 (2007).
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ordinance, which prohibited off-premise signs in commercially-zoned
areas, violated the First Amendment. 22
Simultaneously, the Eleventh Circuit and federal district courts in
Alabama, Florida, and Georgia became embroiled in sign ordinance test
cases brought by three companies-Granite State Outdoor Advertising,
Inc. (Granite State), KH Outdoor, LLC (KH) and Tanner Advertising
Group, LLC (Tanner) (collectively, Advertisers). The exact relationship
between these companies is unclear, but they shared counsel and plainly
cooperated in litigation to challenge sign ordinances in all three states. 23
Their target jurisdictions had enacted sign regulations that limited the
location and size of billboards and restricted billboard content to
commercial speech. The Advertisers submitted multiple sign permit
applications in each jurisdiction, anticipating their denial. Once the
permits were denied, the contrived challenge to the constitutionality of
content-based sign regulation was postured, and an immediate challenge
to permit denial on constitutional grounds was filed with the applicable
federal district court. 24
The Advertisers' legal challenges to sign ordinances foreshadowed
Reed. Unrelated to the Advertisers, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia held in Lamar Advertising Co. v. City of
Douglasville25 that Douglasville's sign ordinance was unconstitutional
under First Amendment strict scrutiny analysis because it was contentbased and granted unbridled discretion to approve sign permits. 26
However, the Eleventh Circuit seemed less strict in cases involving the
Advertisers, focusing on standing and procedural limitations while
avoiding the facial constitutional attacks on the regulating ordinances.
In Granite State Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Clearwater,27 the
court held that it was proper to deny a permit for an oversized sign under
a sign ordinance that was content-neutral. 28 In Granite State Outdoor

22. Id. at 319, 647 S.E.2d at 28.
23. KH and Granite were parties to a settlement agreement with the City of John's
Creek on October 20, 2014, resolving thirty-one billboard permit applications that were first
challenged in 2006. See generally Settlement Agreement, Action Outdoor Advert. JV, LLC
v. Fulton Cty. (Oct. 20, 2014), Nos. 2005CV10977, 2005CV107555, 2005CV109918,
2006CV114781, 2006CV117063, available at https://johnscreekpost.com/wp-content/up
loads/2016/09/Billboard settlement agreement.pdf- see also KH Outdoor, LLC v. Fulton
Cty., 433 F. App'x 775 (11th Cir. 2011). Wayne Charles is identified as a principal of Granite
State in Coffey v. Fayette County, 289 Ga. App. 153, 153, 656 S.E.2d 262, 263 (2008).
24. Id.
25. 254 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (N.D. Ga. 2003).
26. Id. at 1339-40.
27. 351 F.3d 1112 (11th Cir. 2003).
28. Id. at 1117.
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Advertising, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale,29 Granite State Outdoor
Advertising, Inc. v. Cobb County,30 and Granite State Outdoor
Advertising, Inc. v. City of Roswell, 31 Granite State lacked standing to
challenge alleged prior restraints on speech in the ordinances, which did
not impact the permit applications. 32
On the other hand, the Advertisers succeeded in KH Outdoor, LLC v.
City of Trussville,33 challenging an ordinance that restricted the content
of billboards to commercial speech and their location to property
adjoining interstate highways. 34 The Eleventh Circuit applied strict
scrutiny analysis and held that the Trussville ordinance was an
unconstitutional content-based speech regulation under the First
Amendment. 35 The City of Trussville was enjoined from denying KH all
eleven permits for which it applied. 36 In Coffey v. Fayette County,37 the
Georgia Supreme Court held that the Georgia Constitution provided
"even broader protection than the First Amendment .

.

. requir[ing the]

government to adopt the least restrictive means of achieving its
[legislative] goals." 38 The Coffey litigation included several appeals to
Georgia's appellate courts. Where they were unsuccessful, the
Advertisers usually petitioned for Supreme Court review. However, the
Supreme Court denied each application for certiorari. 39 Had certiorari
been granted to the Advertisers' appeals, the Supreme Court would have
confronted challenges to sign regulations on the same grounds presented
in Reed.
II. PASTOR REED'S CHURCH AND THE TOWN'S SIGN ORDINANCE

Justice Thomas's opinion in Reed proffers a pure strict scrutiny
analysis by which all sign ordinances that can conceivably be facially

29. 194 F. App'x 754 (11th Cir. 2006).
30. 193 F. App'x 900 (11th Cir. 2006).
31. 283 Ga. 417, 658 S.E.2d 587 (2008).
32. City of Fort Lauderdale, 194 F. App'x at 757-58; Cobb Cty., 193 F. App'x at 90506; City of Roswell, 283 Ga. at 421-22, 658 S.E.2d at 590.
33. 458 F.3d 1261 (2006).
34. Id. at 1264-65.
35. Id. at 1271.
36. Id. at 1273.
37. 279 Ga. 111, 610 S.E.2d 41 (2005). Coffey was joined as a plaintiff by Wayne
Charles, a principal of Granite State. See Coffey v. Fayette Cty., 289 Ga. App. 153, 153, 656
S.E.2d 262, 263 (2008).
38. Id. at 111, 610 S.E.2d at 42. See also Tinsley Media, LLC v. Pickens Cty., 2005 WL
6211222 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
39. Granite State Outdoor Advert., Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 551 U.S. 1102
(2007); Granite State Outdoor Advert., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 543 U.S. 813 (2004).
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content-based will be judged. All of the justices, concurring in at least the
judgment, reached the conclusion that, because the Town's Sign Code on
its face regulated "signs based on the type of information they convey"
and imposed "different restrictions" based thereon, it was
unconstitutionally underinclusive. 40 The problem evident in the multiple
separate opinions filed is that the justices appear to have very different
ideas of what constitutes a proper regulation.
The Church, in Reed, lacked a set location at which to hold their
services. Therefore, it deployed twenty or less temporary signs bearing
the Church's name and the time and location of its next service.
Typically, the Church placed the signs in the public right-of-way from
Saturday morning until Sunday afternoon. Under the Sign Code, the
Town required a permit to display an outdoor sign unless it fell within
one of twenty-three categories of exceptions. The rules and regulations
applicable to each sign varied with the categories. 41 The Church's signs
constituted "Temporary Directional Signs Relating to a Qualifying
Event" (Temporary Directional Sign), which were permitted during a
limited time frame. 42 Specifically, a Temporary Directional Sign could be
displayed on private property or in the public right-of-way for only twelve
hours before a "qualifying event" 43 and one hour thereafter with a
maximum of four signs per parcel. Additionally, a Temporary Directional
Sign could not be more than six square feet in area. The Town twice cited
the Church for violating the time limitation. 44
However, the Sign Code gave a "Political Sign," for example, more
favorable treatment than Temporary Directional Signs. Defined as a
"temporary sign designed to influence the outcome of an election called
by a public body," a political sign could be erected sixty days before a
primary election and for fifteen days after the general election. 45 Such a
sign could also be placed on undeveloped municipal property, residential
and nonresidential property, and the public right-of-way. Finally, a
political sign was limited to a maximum area of thirty-two square feet,

40. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2224.
41. Id. at 2224-25.
42. Id. at 2225 (quoting Gilbert, Ariz., LAND DEV. CODE § 4.402(P) (2005)).
43. Id. The Ordinance defined a qualifying event as an "assembly, gathering, activity,
or meeting sponsored, arranged, or promoted by a religious, charitable, community service,
education, or other similar nonprofit organization." Id. (quoting Gilbert, Ariz., LAND DEV.
CODE, Glossary of Gen. Terms 25 (2005)).
44. Id. (quoting Gilbert, Ariz., LAND DEV. CODE § 4.402(P)). The second citation also
noted "the Church's failure to include the date of the event on the signs." Id.
45. Id. at 2224 (quoting Gilbert, Ariz., LAND DEV. CODE, Glossary of Gen. Terms 23);
Gilbert, Ariz., LAND DEV. CODE § 4.402(I) (2005).
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except for a political sign on residential property which could only be up
46
to sixteen square feet.
Additionally, a sign with a message that qualified it as an "Ideological
Sign" received even more preferential treatment. An Ideological Sign was
defined as one "communicating a message or ideas for noncommercial
purposes" and not qualifying as "a Construction Sign, Directional Sign,
Temporary Directional Sign ... Political Sign, Garage Sale Sign, or a sign
owned or required by a governmental agency."4 7 Such a sign could be up
to twenty square feet and "be placed in all 'zoning districts' without time
limits."48
After the Church was told that the Town would grant it "no leniency
under the [Sign] Code," the Church, led by Pastor Reed, filed suit in the
United States District Court for the District of Arizona alleging that the
Sign Code was unconstitutional on its face and violated freedom of speech
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States of America. The district court denied the Church's request
for a preliminary injunction, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. On remand,
the district court found that the Sign Code's categories of signs were
content-neutral and passed constitutional scrutiny. The Ninth Circuit
50
again affirmed. 49 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.
III. JUSTICE THOMAS'S OPINION
Justice Thomas's opinion began by reiterating that content-based sign
regulations are restrictions on freedom of speech that "are presumptively
51
The
unconstitutional" and must survive strict scrutiny analysis.
enacting government bears the burden of proof to show that a contentbased sign regulation is "narrowly tailored to serve compelling state
interests." 52 A law is content-based if, on its face, it distinguishes speech
based on topic, idea, or message.53 Content-based regulations are
obviously facially content-based if they regulate speech based on either
54
the particular subject matter or the function or purpose of the speech.
However, facially content-neutral regulations are still content-based

46. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2224-25; Gilbert, Ariz., LAND DEV. CODE § 4.402(1).
47. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2224 (quoting Gilbert, Ariz., LAND DEV. CODE, Glossary of Gen.
Terms 23).
48. Id. (quoting Gilbert, Ariz., LAND DEV. CODE

49. Id. at 2225-26.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 2226.
Id.
Id. at 2226, 2231.
Id. at 2227.
Id.

§ 4.402(J) (2005)).
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regulations if they are unable to "be 'justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech' or are based on the government's
disagreement with the message.5 5 If the sign regulation's justification is
content-based, then its facial neutrality is irrelevant to constitutional
analysis.5 6 Additionally, the government's motive for enacting the sign
regulation is only relevant if the regulation is content-neutral.5 7
Clearly, the Town's Sign Code regulated signs differently based on
their "communicative content"-the topic 5 8 of the sign-and thus,
constituted a facially content-based regulation.5 9 Drawing an example
from his current reading list, Justice Thomas demonstrated the Sign
Code's facially content-based nature. 60 Justice Thomas noted that
various signs, all related to John Locke's Two Treatises of Government,
are treated differently under the ordinance. 61 A Temporary Directional
Sign advertising the time and location of a book club discussion of Locke's
treatises is treated differently than a "Political Sign" supporting a
candidate that follows Locke's principles. 62 Further, both signs receive
inferior privileges to "a sign expressing an ideological view rooted in
Locke's theory of government." 63 Since the Church's signs were treated
differently from other signs based on their content-information about a
"qualifying event"-the Sign Ordinance was content-based on its face
and, therefore, subject to strict scrutiny. 64
Even accepting as compelling the Town's stated interests of preserving
aesthetic appeal and protecting traffic safety, the Sign Code's categories
of twenty-three exemptions failed the strict scrutiny analysis "as
hopelessly underinclusive." 65 The Town could not show that the different
rules for the various categories of signs were narrowly tailored to
preserve aesthetics and assist traffic safety.66 For example, Temporary
Directional Signs were limited in number while Ideological Signs were
allowed "unlimited proliferation," 6 7 though both can distract drivers and

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
Id.
Id. at 2228-29.
Id. at 2230.
Id. at 2227.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2231.
Id. at 2231-32.
Id. at 2231.
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impact traffic safety. 68 The Court, in its rebuke of the circuit court's
analysis, justified its sharp rule, stating: "The First Amendment requires
no less. Innocent motives do not eliminate the danger of censorship
presented by a facially content-based statute, as future government
officials may one day wield such statutes to suppress disfavored
speech."69
Justice Thomas enumerated several valid criteria that can be used to
regulate signs, including: "size, building materials, lighting, moving
parts, and portability." 70 Additionally, his opinion would allow a total
prohibition of signs posted on public property if the regulation "does so in
an evenhanded, content-neutral manner."7 1 Presumably, other criteria,
such as distinctions among zoning districts may also be permissible. The
majority opinion, however, only provided an illustrative, but certainly not
exhaustive, list of possible bases for regulation that may survive strict
scrutiny analysis, but otherwise, it did not offer much guidance. 72 Finally,
Justice Thomas offered the consolation that a sign ordinance might
survive strict scrutiny if it is narrowly tailored to, for example, ensuring
safety of drivers, passengers, and pedestrians. 73 However, such
ordinances are rare.
IV. THE ALITO CONCURRENCE JUSTIFIES AND ATTEMPTS TO CLARIFY
Justice Alito's concurrence, joined by Justices Kennedy and
Sotomayor, attempted to give some guidance to local governments on the
revisions required to make their sign ordinances comply with Reed. 74
First, Justice Alito reiterated the need for Reed's sharp rule: "Limiting
speech based on its 'topic' or 'subject' favors those who do not want to
disturb the status quo. Such regulations may interfere with democratic
self-government and the search for truth."7 5 Then, he tried to identify
safe harbors that will not run afoul of Reed.76 He suggested that
non-content-based regulations could relate to: (1) the "locations,"
presumably zoning districts, "in which signs may be placed;" (2) fixed
versus electronic or moving messages; (3) signs on-premises and
off-premises; (4) sign density; and (5) temporary restrictions for one-time

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id.

76. Id.

2232.
2229.
2232.

2233 (Alto, J., concurring).
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events.77 Justice Alito's concurrence ignores that on- and off-premise sign
regulations by definition regulate sign content, as noted above in the
Eleventh Circuit cases that precede Reed. Further, his concurrence
shows that identification of unconstitutional content-based sign
regulations may depend on the personal sensibilities of the justices or
other appellate court. As Justice Kagan noted in a footnote to her
concurrence:
Even in trying (commendably) to limit today's decision, Justice Alito's
concurrence highlights its far-reaching effects. According to Justice
Alito, the majority does not subject to strict scrutiny regulations of
"signs advertising a one-time event." But of course it does. On the
majority's view, a law with an exception for such signs "singles out
specific subject matter for differential treatment" and "defin[es]
regulated speech by a particular subject matter." Indeed the precise
reason the majority applies strict scrutiny here is that "the [Sign] Code
singles out signs bearing a particular message: the time and location
of a specific event." 78
Then, Justice Alito rebutted that a temporary sign for a one-time event
is like temporal ordinances related to oral speech or music-in other
words, noise ordinances. 7 9
V. THE BREYER AND KAGAN CONCURRENCES-READ, DISSENTS
Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, concurred
with the judgment of the court, but separately refuted Reed's majority
rule. Her concurrence noted that local governments across the country
have sign ordinances that "exempt[] certain categories of signs based on
their subject matter."8 0 And, these ordinances will most likely be struck
down because "it is the 'rare case[] in which a speech restriction
withstands strict scrutiny."'8 1 She urged that the invalidation of a
substantial number of local governments' sign ordinances does not
support the majority's articulated rationale for subjecting content-based
regulations to strict scrutiny. 82 Specifically, nullifying sign ordinances,
even those that regulate based on subject matter, does not preserve the

77. Id.
78. Id. at 2237 n.* (Kagan, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 2227, 2230 (majority opinion),
id. at 2233 (Alito, J., concurring)).
79. Id. at 2233 (Alito, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 2236 (Kagan, J., concurring).
81. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656,
1666 (2015)).
82. Id. at 2237.
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free marketplace of ideas or ensure that the government has not
regulated speech based on favoritism or hostility toward the message or
speaker.83 In short, these ordinances reflected no "realistic possibility
that official suppression of ideas is afoot." 84
Instead, Justice Kagan suggested that the Court apply its contentbased regulation precedent "with a dose of common sense," 85 thereby
leaving regulations that do not implicate these concerns undisturbed.8 6
In fact, she argued in her concurrence that the Court's precedent shows
that it has done just that, contrary to the majority's assertion that binary
tests like Reed's rule have been the norm.8 7 She cited Members of City
Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent,88 decided thirty-one
years earlier, where the Court declined to require strict scrutiny analysis
to evaluate the constitutionality of an ordinance that exempted markers
commemorating cultural, historical, or artistic events and address
numbers from a regulation limiting the maximum number of sidewalk
signs.89 Justice Kagan noted that, in Members, the Court applied
intermediate scrutiny and upheld the ordinance because the
government's "enactment and enforcement revealed 'not even a hint of
bias or censorship."'9 0
Similarly, she cited City of Ladue v. Gilleo,91 in which the Court held
that a regulation exempting safety signs, for-sale signs, and address
signs in a residential zoning district did not trigger strict scrutiny, 92
though the underinclusive nature of the regulation meant it was
unconstitutional under any level of scrutiny. 93 In City of Ladue, the sign
regulation's underinclusiveness was the same as in Reed or, as Justice
Thomas noted in the majority opinion, the ordinance was "hopelessly
underinclusive." 94 Accordingly, Justice Kagan argued that there was no
need for the majority to adopt Reed's rule and effectively invalidate every
local government sign ordinance across the country that contains a

83. Id.
84. Id. (quoting Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 551 U.S. 177, 189 (2007)).
85. Id. at 2238.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
89. Id. at 804-10.
90. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2238 (Kagan, J., concurring) (quoting Members of City Council
of Los Angeles, 466 U.S. at 804).
91. 512 U.S. 43 (1994).
92. Id. at 46-47, 47 n.6.
93. Id. at 58.
94. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2231.
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subject-matter exemption.9 5 Reed's rule, nonetheless, will raise its head
in courts throughout the land destroying "entirely reasonable" sign
regulations when "vindication of First Amendment values [does not]
require[] that result."9 6

Justice Breyer's disdain for Reed's rule compelled him to file a separate
concurring opinion, but join Justice Kagan's concurrence.9 7 He argued,
like Justice Kagan, that the court should apply common sense to sign
regulations because content regulation "cannot and should not always
trigger strict scrutiny"9 8 since regulation almost always impacts
content.99 According to Justice Breyer, Reed's strict scrutiny analysis
prescribes judicial management of normal regulatory activity.100
However, Justice Breyer believed that the Town's Sign Code was
unconstitutional. 101 His concurrence suggested the following approach:
"[G]enerally treat content discrimination as a strong reason weighing
against the constitutionality of a rule where a traditional public forum,
or where viewpoint discrimination, is threatened, but elsewhere treat it
as a rule of thumb . . . ."102 In other words, the Court's First Amendment
analysis should weigh the harm to First Amendment rights against the
regulation's objectives, based on analysis factors which include: (1) the
harm to First Amendment interests; (2) the importance of the
regulation's objectives; (3) the extent to which the regulation will achieve
103
those objectives; and (4) whether other, less restrictive means exists.

VI. THE RESPONSE TO REED, ITS IMPACT AND SIGNIFICANCE

When first issued, the Reed decision initially threw local governments
into a frenzy. There was much hand-wringing over the prospect that sign
ordinances everywhere were unconstitutional and subject to immediate
challenge. There was a rush to develop compliant sign regulations.
Discussions immediately commenced about enacting sign permit
moratoria. As time passed, some jurisdictions acted promptly, while
others did not. Local governments had two choices: strip ordinances down
to the majority's criteria, whatever that might be, or wait and see. A nonscientific survey of jurisdictions within Alabama, Florida, and Georgia

95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 2239 (Kagan, J., concurring).
(emphasis omitted).
at 2234 (Breyer, J., concurring).
(Breyer, J., concurring).

99. Id.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id. at 2236.
Id. at 2235.
Id. at 2235-36.
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suggests many local governments have not amended their sign
ordinances to conform to Reed. As they wait for additional cases to
interpret Reed and provide more guidance as to its application, their sign
ordinances are subject to challenges that may be waiting in the wings. At
some point, jurisdictions must develop content-neutral sign regulations
that do not run afoul of Reed. Until the regulatory revisions implemented
in response to Reed are judicially tested in a series of opinions, there will
be no authoritative guidance. However, there is obvious risk inherent in
a jurisdiction's decision to wait and see.104
Interestingly, there is no evidence that the Advertisers who
aggressively challenged sign ordinances within Eleventh Circuit
jurisdictions are back at work, three years post-Reed. The apparent
inactivity could mean that the Advertisers believe that the Church did
their work for them in Reed, and they recognize they are beneficiaries of
that decision. Or, the inactivity could mean that the Advertisers grew
tired of incurring the costs required to support a decade-long battle
against sign regulations. Irrespective, research shows that the Eleventh
Circuit has yet to address a sign regulation challenge in light of Reed.
Eleventh Circuit precedent indicates it will not water down or erode
Reed. 05 The same precedent suggests that Reed's impact will be
tempered by the Eleventh Circuit's stringent requirement that the
regulation challenger show standing.
In some respects, Reed does not dramatically change First
Amendment, free speech constitutional standards applied to sign
regulations. Prior case law applied strict scrutiny analysis to sign
regulations that facially applied different regulatory treatment to sign
content. But, the tenor of Reed is stronger, and its language is more
disciplinary than in prior cases. Also, it is important to recognize that the
Supreme Court granted review of Reed, while it rejected review of the
Advertisers' cases from the Eleventh Circuit-even though they
presented the same constitutional challenge. This begs the question: Why

Reed?
The answer may be quite simple: Reed is not a case about signs.
Instead, Reed is a result-driven opinion intended to protect religious
exercise shrouded in the context of a challenge to sign regulations. Reed
presented the Supreme Court with a challenge to the Town's Sign Code
104. See Sweet Sage Caf6, LLC v. Town of N. Redington Beach, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11413 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 2017) (invalidating a sign ordinance under Reed and Eleventh
Circuit precedent as "hopelessly underinclusive"). Sweet Sage Cafg is the only case research
reviewed that analyzed a sign ordinance in the Eleventh Circuit under Reed.
105. See, e.g., Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune Beach, 410 F.3d 1250, 1268-69 (11th Cir.
2005) (applying strict scrutiny to and invalidating a content-based sign regulation that, like
the Town of Gilbert's, prohibited all signs except for certain subject-matter categories).
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which regulated the Church's signs but, more importantly, impacted the
ability of its followers to learn about the location of its services and
engage in religious expression. A tiny church was confronted with sign
regulations, hyper-imposed by a Town that would grant "no leniency"
from their strict enforcement. The Supreme Court, having rejected
appeals from the Advertisers and possibly others, did not seem as
concerned about the same content-based constitutional violations
resulting from ordinances when challenged by commercial businesses.
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to reach the same conclusions
about similarly constitutionally infirmed content-based ordinances long
before the facts of Reed arose, but it did not. It is doubtful that the
Supreme Court would have expressed its opinion in the same tenor and
with the same breadth and scope had the Town enforced its
unconstitutional Sign Code against the Kiwanis Club advertising its
Pancake Day or a secular school group advertising its fundraising car
wash. The reality is that the Supreme Court, in one swoop, voided sign
ordinances across the country on the basis of unconstitutional contentbased regulation when its real purpose was to aid the free exercise of
religion.

